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The threat to facility time in the Trade Union Act 2016 – a necessary austerity measure?  
Abstract 
One of the less well publicised sections of the Trade Union Act 2016 is the provision for monitoring and 
potentially reducing the amount by which public bodies subsidise the duties carried out by trade union 
representatives in the workplace. The justification for the monitoring of costs and the potential for the imposition of 
a cap on such spending in the future appears to be based on dubious evidence. This paper examines the range of 
duties carried out by representatives and their attributed costs, consulting a large body of research which strongly 
suggests that the indirect cost-benefits to the employer greatly outweigh the direct costs which must now be reported 
to the Government by public employers. The paper highlights the concern that the indirect cost-benefits have not 
been taken into account in seeking justification for this legislative measure, and that reductions in facility time in 





The various provisions of the Trade Union Act 2016 (TUA) pose possibly the greatest threat 
to trade union freedom since the raft of anti-union Conservative legislation enacted between 
1979 and 1997. These new restrictions have been comprehensively documented and analyzed in 
the recent special issue of the Industrial Law Journal. Nevertheless, the threat to facility time for 
trade union workplace representatives, those at the coalface of trade union activism, is less well 
publicised. The Act puts at risk the paid time off which union representatives have come to 
expect as a right, and a vital adjunct to their role and responsibilities. This particular aspect of the 
new legislation carries potentially the greatest threat to the ability of trade unions to organise and 
bargain collectively, as it could undermine the ability of representatives to represent their 
members effectively and to promote membership in the workplace.   
Good employers recognise the value of workplace representation, but a government which 
focuses purely on the financial cost of supporting the role of representatives will inevitably seek 
to reduce that expense, citing it as a ‘burden on business’ and, in the case of publicly-funded 
employers, a direct cost to the taxpayer.  The true cost of the proposed restrictions to facility 
time may take many years to become evident, but this particular provision has the potential to 




2. What is a trade union representative, and why do they need facility time? 
The ACAS Code of Practice on Time off for Trade Union Duties and Activities 2010, issued 
under s. 199 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA), 
defines a representative as ‘an employee who has been elected or appointed in accordance with 
the rules of the independent union to be a representative of all or some of the union’s members 
in the particular company or workplace’, and provides details of what a representative may be 
expected to do.  
  Among the 6.4 million trade union members in the UK (Trade Union Membership Statistical 
Bulletin, DTI, 2014), about 200,000 are involved in trade union duties in the workplace. Union 
representatives take an average of just over 13 paid hours per week, although 49 per cent of all 
union representatives spend less than 5 hours per week on their role (WERS Study, 2011). Where 
there are many thousands of members, the union representative may even be full-time, although 
paid as if he or she was an employee of the relevant employer. These are few in number, 
however, and in 2011 only one in six senior representatives carried out their role on a full-time 
basis. Representatives provide advice to members, represent them in grievance and disciplinary 
meetings, and negotiate with managers. They provide the main link between unions and their 
members, with the responsibility for facilitating communications between them. The Donovan 
Report 1968 (Cmnd. 3623, 1968) also noted that they are involved in ‘recruiting new members 
and ensuring that existing members do not lapse’ and that without them ‘trade unions would lack 
for members, for money, and for means of keeping in touch with their members.’ This continues 
to be as true today as it was then, despite the improvements brought about by electronic 
communication. 
Many of them have specialist roles relating to health and safety or environmental issues, 
while others specialise in equality and diversity matters, or work as union learning representatives 
(ULRs) who work to improve access to training opportunities. These ULRs promote, encourage 
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and support the take-up and delivery of learning at work, acting to raise interest in training and 
offering peer level support. They may negotiate with the employer around time off for 
employees to engage in training and can offer guidance and advice on training opportunities 
(Reps in Action, BERR, 2009). 
3. The legislation 
There has been a statutory right to reasonable time off from a union representative’s job in 
order to carry out union duties and undertake training since 1975 (Employment Protection Act). 
This provision was replaced by TULRCA, s.168. The section imposes a duty on an employer to 
permit employees who are officials of a recognised, independent trade union, to take reasonable 
time off during working hours to carry out their duties. These include under s.168(1)(a) 
negotiations relating to collective bargaining on matters falling within s. 178(2)  
Other duties include: performance on behalf of employees of functions related to or 
connected with that provision (s. 168(1)(b)); receipt of information from the employer or 
consultation by the employer under s.188 (redundancies) or under the Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) (TUPE) Regulations 2006 (s. 168(1)(c)); negotiations with a view to 
entering into an agreement under Regulation 9 of the TUPE Regulations (s. 168(1)(d)); or the 
performance on behalf of employees of functions related to the making of an agreement under 
that regulation (s. 168(1)(e)).  
Section 168(2) further permits an employee to take time off during his working hours for the 
purpose of undergoing training in aspects of industrial relations. There is additional legislative 
provision for time off to accompany members to meetings (s. 10(6) of the Employment 
Relations Act 1999, and to act as a safety representative under regulations made under section 
2(4) of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. The duties of a trade union representative 
are therefore very varied, surprisingly wide, and can be extremely time-consuming. The 
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representatives also require considerable training in order to carry out their duties effectively, 
although this is usually provided by the relevant union or the TUC at no cost to the employer. 
Section 13 of the Trade Union Act inserts a new section 172A into the 1992 Act. This relates 
primarily to publication requirements of facility time for public sector employers. Local 
authorities are already required to publish this information under the Local Authorities (Data 
Transparency) Code 2015. This provision empowers a Government Minister to make regulations 
requiring all public sector employers to publish information relating to the number of union 
officials within the organisation, the total amount spent on paying such officials, and the 
percentage of the employer’s total bill spent on paying them (TUA, s. 13(3)). 
Furthermore, s. 14 inserts a new s. 172B into the 1992 Act. This provides that, three years 
after the first regulations under s. 172A come into force, if a Minister has concerns about the 
amount of facility time provided in an individual employer’s case, he may use his reserve powers 
to make regulations to restrict that time and its associated cost in the future. The Minister can 
then specify the percentage of total income that employers are able to spend on providing time 
off to trade union officials. Under s. 14(4), the regulations may make provision for restricting the 
rights of relevant union officials to facility time by amending or modifying the current legislation 
on time off for those officials. Perhaps most worryingly, under s. 14(10), this legislation may not 
only affect public sector employers, but all employers where there is a recognised trade union. Thus, in 
future, the government could potentially act to unilaterally reduce the facility time agreement 
which employers have negotiated with their recognised trade union, whether they are public or 
private employers. 
This reserve power is potentially extremely wide, and arguably goes far beyond that which is 
necessary to limit public authority spending on trade unions. The amount of time spent on 
representing members in the workplace did not change between 2004 and 2011, but the range of 
issues and their prevalence did increase over this period (WERS Study, 2011), suggesting that 
6 
 
representatives needed more time, rather than less, in order to deal effectively with the increased 
workload. This would suggest that the valuable work of the representative is already under-
funded; the danger with the new legislation is that it may well exacerbate that situation. 
 
4. Difficulties currently faced by trade union representatives. 
The 2016 Act could potentially decimate the existing provision of facility time for 
representatives. Meanwhile, the ongoing austerity programme and a vote in the EU referendum 
to leave the European Union may bring greater uncertainty, with further reductions in workers’ 
rights and legal protections a distinct possibility. These additional concerns come at a time when 
representatives are already under severe pressure to provide support to members in the 
workplace.  
The findings of a DTI Consultation Document (Workplace Representatives: A Review of their 
Facilities and Facility Times, January 2007) examined the function of workplace representatives and 
the difficulties they experienced in gaining sufficient time off to facilitate their roles. They 
highlighted the increasing demands on representatives, particularly in terms of individual 
representation, with organisational changes bringing increased demands and pressures. Managers 
were often resistant to representatives having more than their initial training, failing to recognise 
that representatives needed to update their skills in order to deal with organisational and 
legislative change. Staff cover was a major barrier to time-off for union representatives. There 
was a consensus that many managers neither understood nor appreciated the role of workplace 
union representatives and their entitlement to time-off for union duties. Representatives also felt 
strongly that their work was undervalued, and that this reflected the wider weakness in the 
perception of trade unions in the law and in society. 
Many representatives have specialist roles relating to health and safety or environmental 
issues, while others specialise in equality and diversity matters, or work as union learning 
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representatives (ULRs). ULRs work to improve access to training opportunities; they promote, 
encourage and support the take up and delivery of learning at work, acting to raise interest in 
training and offering peer level support. They may negotiate with the employer around time off 
for employees to engage in training and can offer guidance and advice on training opportunities 
(Reps in Action, BERR, 2009). 
In terms of relations with management, the DTI Consultation Document revealed a consensus 
that many managers neither understood nor appreciated the role of workplace union 
representatives and their entitlement to time-off for union duties. Management and union 
interpretations of what was ‘reasonable’ were quite different, although insofar as the issue 
involved Union Learning Representatives (ULRs) and Health and Safety representatives, there 
was less disagreement. The reason for this could be that the benefits to the organisation were 
more immediately apparent and more readily quantifiable. Nevertheless, with such disparate 
views of what constituted ‘value’ to the employer, particularly if this is measured in financial 
terms rather than on any qualitative assessment, the next question must be whether facility time 
does in fact provide demonstratively good value to the employer. 
 
5. Does ‘time off’ provide value to the employer? 
The focus of policy attention has been on cost-effectiveness of trade unions, rather than on 
facilitating effective representation, and accords with the general move towards cutting 
‘unnecessary’ costs to employers, begun by the Coalition Government’s ‘Red-Tape Challenge’. 
The facility time restrictions in the 2016 Act seem to be rooted in the notion that employers 
spend an unnecessary percentage of their income on providing time off to representatives, yet 
this takes no account of the indirect cost-saving to employers engendered by the work they do.  
The DTI Consultation Document indentified a broad spectrum of ways in which representatives 
provide benefits to employers, although it is acknowledged that applying a precise cost benefit to 
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their involvement is not an exact science. Nevertheless, the potential benefits in a number of 
areas were clearly thought to outweigh the costs. These were categorised as: skills and training; 
lower exit rates and labour turnover through effective dispute resolution; and worker safety and 
productivity.  
i. Skills and training 
The concept of the Union Learning Representative (ULR) was fairly new at the time of this 
report, having only gained a statutory footing in 2002 (TULRCA 1992, s. 168A). Therefore there 
was little empirical data available for consideration in the report in 2007, but financial benefits of 
ULRs (through improved productivity brought about by the higher skills) were estimated by the 
Department for Education and Employment (DfFE) to range from £11 million to £49 million 
in the first year (Regulatory Impact Assessment for Providing Statutory Backing for ULRs).  The DfFE 
also estimated that around twelve employees per ULR would complete their training and thereby 
enhance productivity as a direct result of ULR intervention. The report admitted that how these 
productivity gains are accrued ‘will vary according to the structure of the labour and product 
market, as well as the climate of industrial relations,’ but assuming ‘a 3-5 per cent premium on 
the average wage of those who received additional training, this gives annual benefits in 2004 of 
£94 - £156 million.’ The TUC was able to offer a revised estimate of the value made to the UK’s 
GDP in 2011, suggesting that where there is a ULR in a workplace, employees were eight times 
more likely to receive between two and five days training each year. Based on data in the Leitch 
Review of Skills, (Leitch Review of Skills: Prosperity for All in the Global Economy – world class skills, 
2006), the value to GDP was estimated at £6 billion. 
ii. Exit rates, labour turnover and dispute resolution 
It is suggested that workplace representatives offer an alternative to leaving employment in 
order to voice a grievance (R. Freeman and J. Medoff, What do Unions Do? 1984; cf. A.O. 
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Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, 1970). This results in savings on recruitment costs and the 
cost of reduced labour productivity as a result of loss of job skills (DTI Consultation Document). 
Research also found that ‘direct and representative participation had a positive impact on 
employee attitudes and behaviour, which in turn improved labour retention and reduced 
absenteeism.’ According to the 2004 WERS data, the dismissal rate in organisations with a 
representative voice (which could include non-union representation), was 1.53 per cent 
compared with 1.96 per cent where there was no representation. Similar evidence can be found 
in the WERS data published in 2014 which showed that avoiding unnecessary exits saves 
millions of pounds in recruitment costs, in addition to the ‘substantial psychic costs for 
employees’. In an updated TUC review of the DTI data in 2011 (The Facts about Facility Time, 
2011), using the same formulae, it was estimated that the work of union representatives results 
in: 
 Overall productivity gains worth between four and twelve billion pounds to the UK 
economy; 
 Savings of at least £19 million as a result of reducing dismissals; 
 Savings to employers of between £82 million and £143 million in recruitment costs as a 
result of reducing early exits. 
 
iii. Worker safety and productivity 
 
The WERS First Findings Report 2014 compiled a list of the ways in which employers 
consult with their workforce on health and safety matters, finding that twenty per cent 
communicate through employee representatives, a figure which varied only slightly according to 
the size of the workforce. A number of studies have indicated that the presence of health and 
safety representatives and joint consultation plays a significant role in improving health and 
safety in the workplace. The HSE study by Walters et al was able to conclude from an 
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examination of a large number of previous studies that the great majority of them ‘broadly 
support the notion that joint arrangements, trade unions and trade union representation on 
health and safety at the workplace are associated with better health and safety outcomes than 
when employers manage OHS without worker representative participation,’ (Contract Research 
Report 363, HSE 2005). Another study based on WERS 1998 data found specifically that in 
workplaces with a trade union presence, the injury rate was 24 per cent lower, (A.S. Litwin, Trade 
Unions and Industrial Injury in Great Britain, LSE, 2000). Even assuming a modest reduction of ten 
to fifteen per cent, the Walters study estimated that the reduction in injuries in the collective 
workforce would be between 8,000 and 13,000. The Health and Safety Executive estimated that 
the full cost to society as a result of injury or ill health caused by current or recent working 
conditions to be £14.3 billion in 2013/14 (Health and Safety Statistics at a Glance, 2014/15, HSE). 
Significantly, although around 60 per cent of the costs are borne by the individual, 20 per cent 
are borne by both the employer and the State, so any reduction in this cost through effective 
union representation should be given serious consideration by the government. 
Research on the value of facility time (The Value of Trade Union Facility Time: Insight, Challenges 
and Solutions, NatCen, 2012) identified four main benefits arising from the use of facility time:  
 Provision of a ready-made structure for meaningful consultation and negotiation, saving 
organizations money and providing reassurance for members that their views are valued 
in decision-making. 
 Facilitation of partnership-working with trade unions that improved workplace relations 
and the reputation of an employer as ‘a good place to work’. 
 Earlier intervention in relation to complaints, grievances and disciplinaries preventing 
escalation into more serious problems; thereby saving organizations and taxpayers money 
by reducing the impact on staff time and possible legal costs. 
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 Better communication to manage change during restructuring and redundancy processes; 
thereby improving understanding of decisions, minimizing negative impacts and reducing 
the number of working days lost through industrial action. 
Additionally, the report identified that the time had value in itself, leading to ‘better 
representation of members’ views and improved availability of representatives to work with 
employers on areas of common interest.’ 
Previous analyses carried out by the Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform, BERR, (now BIS, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills) suggested that 
the economic benefits of facility time outweighed the costs (Reps in Action: How workplaces can gain 
from modern union representation, 2009). The TUC cited the research in a later report (The Facts about 
Facility Time), claiming that: 
The reality of the provision of facilities and facility time [is that] they cannot simply be 
regarded as ‘costs’ to employers, that on the contrary, union reps and the work that they 
do for members and with employers represent an important workplace resource for UK 
employers in both the public and private sector. 
In an analysis of overall economic benefits, Freeman and Medoff (What do Unions Do?) were 
able to point to new quantitative studies in the United States which indicated that productivity 
appeared to be higher in unionised establishments than in otherwise comparable establishments 
that were non-union, and concluded that higher productivity appears to run hand in hand with 
good industrial relations. 
6. What was the justification for the TUA measures? 
With such strong evidence as to the financial and indirect advantages of unionization in 
industry, and effective representation in the workplace in particular, it is doubtful whether such 
benefits were given adequate consideration by the policy-makers. The Conservatives’ desire to 
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introduce the reforms during the Coalition years was blocked by their Liberal Democrat 
colleagues. Nevertheless, the Trade Union Bill was introduced less than two months after the 
incoming Conservative Government gained power in May 2015. The Trade Union Reform 
Campaign (a group set up with a view to reducing trade union rights) had in fact been working 
on the details of this legislation for several years. It was a limited company (now dissolved), led 
by right-wing Conservatives. Unite the union described the group as ‘a vehicle for discredited 
Tories to pursue an ultra-right wing agenda, but it is the true face of the Tory Party’, while the 
union’s General Secretary, Len McCluskey, called it a ‘rogues gallery, full of discredited Tories 
and unpalatable right wing views’. 
The agenda for change was ideologically driven, with a view to undermining trade unions in 
general and the position of trade union representatives in particular. Although there had been 
sufficient opportunity to make an assessment of the indirect cost-benefits of trade-union 
representation in the workplace, there is little evidence that the Government has given any 
consideration to this evidence in the rush towards ‘reform’. 
Much reliance appears to have been placed initially on the Tax Payers’ Alliance’s (TPA) 
report which purported to show that taxpayers’ money was being used to subsidise trade union 
activities (TPA Research Note 140, 2014). This neo-liberal organization also had some dubious 
credentials, with John Cruddas, the Labour MP, describing it as ‘an arms-length Tory front 
operation run by big powerful business interests’, while Tim Horton, research director of the 
Fabian Society, claimed the group was ‘fundamental to the Conservatives’ political strategy’.  
Its findings suggested that trade unions received a subsidy of £108 million per year - at tax-
payers’ expense - in 2012-13, with at least 2,841 FTEs (full-time equivalent staff) working on 
trade union duties in the public sector in the same period. However, according to the NatCen 
report on the value of facility time, the report did not make findings as to the possible benefits of 
facility time and failed to provide contextual information, such as the number of people 
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represented. The findings are therefore unreliable and their use as the main source of evidence to 
support such a radical change is questionable. 
On 29 February 2012, the Conservative MP, Fiona Bruce, introduced a debate in the House 
of Commons on the transparency, accountability and fairness of trade union funding, and on 
finding the right balance ‘between effective representation of trade union members and value for 
money for the taxpayer’. Bruce claimed that trade unions themselves should pay for the work 
done by representatives. Nevertheless, it appeared that she, like the TPA on whose evidence her 
arguments were apparently based, had not considered the indirect cost-saving that trade unions 
brought to the employers, and seemed determined to focus only on its headline figures. 
Controversially, these figures were also based merely on estimates and were therefore unreliable, 
since not all public sector employers published the details of the percentage of their budget 
which went towards facilitating trade union duties. Of those 1,074 public sector organizations 
surveyed by the TPA, 344 either did not fully record facility time or did not record it at all in 
2012-13 (TPA Research Note 140, 10 September 2014). Nevertheless, despite the serious gaps in 
the data, the TPA chose to conclude that the estimate of 2,841 FTEs was an understatement, when 
it could just as easily have been an overestimate of the cost of providing facility time.  
Could the Government have in fact been responding in a mature and carefully considered 
way to genuine public or business concerns about unions, rather than following an ideological 
agenda? The research appears to suggest that this was not the case. The IpsosMori Trade Unions 
Poll carried out in 2013 found that 78 per cent of Britons agreed that trade unions are essential 
to protect workers’ interests, a finding that had remained consistent over the four decades during 
which the polling organization had been tracking public opinion on trade unions. Only 35 per 
cent believed that unions had too much power, while 50 per cent disagreed. Concern over trade 
union power was much lower than in the 1970s and 1980s when lengthy, damaging strikes 
rocked the country (see K. Laybourn, A History of Trade Unionism, c. 1770-1990, 1992). The report 
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noted that, for the last ten years, the issue of trade unions and strikes had not been mentioned as 
an important issue by more than 1 per cent of those polled. 
Furthermore, in the 2009 report (Reps in Action) produced jointly by BERR (for the 
Government), the CBI (for the employers) and the TUC (for workers and trade unions), there 
was no finding of serious concern either about trade union power or about the cost of providing 
facility time. In examining seven case studies from a diverse range of organisations, the three 
bodies were able to conclude that ‘all those involved – employees, the union and the employer – 
have directly benefited’ from the work of lay union representatives. Findings showed that, ‘where 
workplaces are unionised, employers and trade unions who work efficiently and constructively 
together can improve workplace performance for the mutual benefit of the employer and 
employee.’ 
7. Conclusion 
To have a reasonable chance of success, legislation should be reasonable, based on solid, 
empirical evidence, and provide demonstrable economic justification, in order to be accepted by 
those on whom it has the greatest impact. The evidence presented here indicates an 
overwhelming cost-benefit to workplace representation, with representatives performing many 
valuable services for the employer. There is no discernible, hard evidence to justify an attack on 
trade union facility time, either in the public or the private sector. In fact there is a plethora of 
evidence that trade unions are a precious resource for employers, helping to reduce staff 
turnover, facilitate disciplinary and grievance activity, promote staff training and assist in 
ensuring a safer workplace. The evidence strongly suggests that a workplace would suffer greatly 
if paid time off for representatives was reduced. There could also be a substantial cost to the 
employer, to society and to the tax-payer if a reduction in facility time were to be ordered by the 
Minister in the future. 
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The arguments for reducing facility time should not be reduced to a simple mathematical 
exercise which merely considers the figures on an annual balance sheet. Nevertheless, one 
suspects that whatever figures are presented to the Government over the coming years, the 
Minister will declare them to be excessive, since it is doubtful whether the legislator recognises 
the full value to the employer of the work undertaken by union representatives. There will 
almost certainly be some reductions in facility time in the future, but the overall impact on the 
effectiveness of trade union representation and its attendant indirect financial benefits could be 
nothing short of devastating. 
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